This week the prestigious science
journal, Nature, published
the methods and results of a groundbreaking new experiment in
biotechnology, reigniting a firestorm that has been raging on and off
for nearly a year. The reason for the controversy is the ghastly
topic of the research paper: How to genetically engineer the avian
influenza virus (H5N1) to make it more communicable.
Although
H5N1 (i.e. “bird flu”) has existed in bird populations for
decades, it entered the public consciousness in 2004, when human cases began surfacing in China and Southeast Asia. The cases were
quickly linked to contact with poultry – mostly slaughterhouse
workers or chicken farmers, who directly worked with chickens in
insanitary conditions. H5N1 was far more virulent than the seasonal
strains of influenza which have been circulating since 1918; over 60%
of people who have contracted H5N1 in the past eight years have died
from it. Fortunately, there has been no pandemic. Only 600 people worldwide are known to have had avian influenza. Although it appears
that humans can acquire the disease directly from birds, there have
been no known cases of human-to-human transmission – a prerequisite
for a global pandemic. Although influenza viruses mutate very
quickly, the lack of human-to-human transmission caused some
complacency. Some epidemiologists even went so far as to state that
human-to-human transmission of H5N1 might be impossible.
The
new research blows that theory out of the water. Scientists at the
University of Wisconsin and Erasmus Medical College succeeded in taking the H5N1 virus and combining it with the H1N1 (“swine flu”)
virus. Swine flu is known to be easily communicable between humans
but relatively mild; bird flu is known to be extremely deadly
but difficult to transmit. By combining the two into a hybrid and
making other modifications to the genes of the virus, scientists
developed a “super-strain” of flu. They tested the virus on ferrets, which have an immune system very similar to humans. Not only
did many of the ferrets die, but the disease was easily transmitted
to other ferrets who were not directly exposed to the virus
themselves.
The
research has horrified many scientists. Governments remain gravely
concerned about its publication in Nature.
In the United States, the National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity requested that Nature not
publish the findings in the interest of national security. Although
academia typically does not view censorship kindly, many scientists
found themselves agreeing with the government. Biologist and
Nobel-laureate Sir Richard Roberts said, “Someone is trying to make
the most dangerous virus we can think of. I don't understand how one
can justify that, unless there is no other way of getting the data
that you're interested in.” The risks are huge: Nature
published the methodology that
the scientists used to create their super-strain of flu, potentially
providing a blueprint for terrorists to replicate their efforts.
Additionally, there is the concern that if research like this isn't
shunned, it will continue apace and may one day escape the laboratory
through simple error.
Other
scientists believe that publishing the research is necessary, in
order to prevent future outbreaks. They argue that if we can learn
more about how influenza mutates and infects new people, we will be
better prepared to deal with a future pandemic. They acknowledge the
dangers of the research, but argue that there is no avoiding the fact
that it will soon be possible to create bioengineered diseases, and
it is better to be prepared for them when they do occur.
Additionally, there is the possibility that H5N1 may eventually
evolve into a more communicable form on its own, for which
epidemiologists should prepare. Last month, the US government finally relented. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity
reversed itself, voting 12-6 to allow the publication of the research
to proceed.
As it
stands, I find myself on the side of those urging extreme caution
with this type of research. Bioterrorism will be the greatest
security threat of the early 21st
century; unlike nuclear weapons, biological weapons will soon be
available to many people. Futurist Michio Kaku warns that in the
not-too-distant future, creating new viruses may be as simple as
typing base letters into a piece of software and having a computer
assemble the DNA strand. When that happens, we may have no choice but
to fund research to prevent diseases that do not yet exist in nature.
But until then, it seems that the risks greatly outweigh the rewards.
